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Abstract 
 
The paper shows how democratic elections in a bi-communal society with entrenched 
ethnic voting results in an elected oligarchy in which elites of one ethnic group control 
the allocation of scarce economic resources. Using a simple strategic game, the paper 
shows that the control of resources results in the Nash equilibrium of uneven 
development. Heterogeneous agents are included in the model, which is solved for the 
conditions under which democratic consolidation might occur. Token resource transfers 
from elites to other groups will tend not to guarantee consolidation. Remittances to the 
masses tend to prevent democratic consolidation, while bi-lateral grants to an elite 
dominated government prevent consolidation under some restricted conditions. 
Constitutional institutions might be necessary to incentivize explicit cooperation – the 
anti-Nash equilibrium.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Democratic elections were reintroduced to Guyana on October 5, 1992. On this 
date, the Peoples National Congress (PNC) was displaced by the Peoples Progressive 
Party (PPP) through free and fair elections sponsored by former US President Jimmy 
Carter. Prior to this date the PNC maintained power through rigged elections. However, 
since free and fair election in 1992 there has been a gradual decline of democratic ideals 
(or some just never emerged). The opposition is excluded from the state-owned radio and 
television network, equal treatment under the law appears to be on the wane, the private 
press was pressured with government advertisement boycott, there have been no regional 
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elections in eighteen years, and independent private investors are being pressured while 
the government uses state resources to support the connected business owners.  
This paper argues that the deterioration of political freedoms is rooted in the 
desire to control the economic space. Therefore, there is an economic underpinning of the 
ethnic conflict in Guyana. This conflict manifests itself in strategic ethnic voting that 
results in the Nash equilibrium of uneven economic growth. The elected PPP government 
draws its votes from mainly East Indians, while the main opposition PNC relies almost 
entirely on the African Guyanese population for its support, thus the bi-communal nature 
of the society (Milne, 1988)
1
. On the surface, both parties display a multi-ethnic image 
with individuals from the other ethnic group taking up leadership roles
2
. However, this 
cross-ethnic leadership does not reflect the voting pattern of the population. The ethnic 
voting pattern naturally results in conflict as occurred during the disturbances between 
1998 and 2003 (Kissoon, 2007). The African PNC fears it will be permanently banished 
to the opposition given the entrenched ethnic voting and the numerical advantage of East 
Indians. Fearing permanent banishment to opposition status, African Guyanese elites seek 
to mobilize its masses for resistance through voting as an undivided bloc. Given the 
previous period of rigged elections by the African dominated PNC, East Indians respond 
strategically by also voting for their own ethnic leaders. The numerical advantage of East 
Indian masses almost always makes certain the PPP wins, thus resulting in an East Indian 
                                                 
1 An established literature examines how ethnic fractionalization impedes the formation of economic 
institutions that are critical for promoting economic growth. Although the following is not an exhaustive 
list, see Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier (2000) for work on this topic.  
 
2 See Schmitt (1991) for a definition and survey of various bi-communal societies around the world. 
Guyana was given as one of the examples. Other examples are Fiji, Israel, Trinidad and Tobago, Sri Lanka, 
Belgium, Malaysia, Burundi, Canada, Suriname, etc.   
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dominated elected oligarchy. Later in the paper it would be explained how East Indian 
elites use the democratic process in order to engineer the control of economic resources.    
Is it possible that this situation could make the task of economic development 
more difficult to achieve? How would resources be distributed? Under what conditions 
will democracy consolidate and take firm root? This paper confronts these questions by 
utilizing the framework of Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). The 
approach allows for working out comparative statics showing how exogenous variables 
such as bi-lateral aid and remittances will influence the consolidation of democracy. The 
proposed model will also be used to determine the level of resource allocation at which 
point the masses of each group are no longer apathetic and would demand democratic 
reforms. The level of token compensation East Indian elites will need to pay the masses 
of each group to maintain the status quo is also worked out.  
The model developed herein takes into consideration the bi-communal nature of 
Guyana. Therefore, it includes intra-group as well as inter-group heterogeneity in the 
framework. Instead of having only homogenous elites and masses, this paper includes 
East Indian (EI) elites, African Guyanese (AG) elites, East Indian working masses and 
African Guyanese working masses. The EI elites mobilize the votes of the EI masses to 
gain power, thereby gaining control of economic resources. EI elites, however, must 
compensate the other groups in order to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, the 
AG elites draw on the AG masses when it wants to disrupt the economic activities of the 
EI elites. This heterogeneous nature of the two dominant groups will influence the payoff 
structure and Nash equilibrium of the simple strategic game that will be used later in the 
paper.  
 4 
2. The Making of an Elected Oligarchy and Economic Control 
The elected oligarchy is rooted in the following arrangements. First, it emerges 
out of the principle of Democratic Centralism of the Peoples Progressive Party’s (PPP’s) 
Executive Committee and Central Committee. Essentially, the committees select the 
Presidential Candidate and Members of Parliament who are then offered to the electorate 
in free and fair general elections. Since the candidates are selected from the top, they do 
not necessarily reflect the interests of the mass members of the party. Take for example 
Mr. Moses Nagamootoo and Mr. Frank Anthony who received, respectively, the fifth and 
third highest vote count in the 29
th
 Party Congress (in 2008). At the Congress a total of 
913 votes were casted from a list of 1020 delegates
3
. The delegates would represent the 
PPP’s grass root supporters. However, neither Mr. Anthony nor Mr. Nagamootoo was 
elected by the 35 member Central Committee to be part of decision-making Executive 
Committee. Therefore, the voting decision of a committee of 35 individuals trumped the 
voting of the mass delegates who came from every region in Guyana. Clearly, the internal 
organization of the PPP opens the door for voter collusion as a way of marginalizing 
dissenting party leaders. Recently the Stabroek News, the independent daily newspaper, 
reported Mr. Nagamootoo as saying party members no longer matter in the selection of 
                                                 
 
3 See the following report for more detailed election result: “PPP’s 29th Congress -Moses, Donald, Frank in 
top 5”. (2008, August 4). Stabroek News, http://www.stabroeknews.com/2008/stories/08/04/ppp9s-29th-
congress/ 
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their presidential candidate
4
. However, the PPP has recently signaled its continuing 
commitment to the top-down method of leadership selection
5
.  
This selection mechanism, moreover, represents a crucial filtering process to find 
like-minded leaders who would be supportive of the President. These like-minded 
individuals determine the destiny of the country as they become part of the government 
and Members of Parliament. Once elected, the leadership of the PPP, purged of 
dissenting leaders, now enjoys the benefits of the marginally reformed 1980 Forbes 
Burnham Constitution. An addition to the 1980 Constitution requires that coalitions occur 
before the election and not after. The reason for this is for the PPP to scare their East 
Indian voters into not splitting their votes. At election time the rallying cry is a vote for 
an independent third party is a vote for the PNC; as a scare tactic East Indians are 
reminded about the bad years under the PNC dictatorship. The PNC also does its fair 
share of voter mobilization of African Guyanese almost completely ignoring East Indian 
communities. As noted earlier, the internal selection process of the PPP is susceptible to 
voter collusion and even coercion. This was made clear in the media by one faction of the 
PPP which wants the Presidential Candidate to be elected by secret ballot, while another 
prefers show-of-hands (Ramkarran, 2010). In the event where the show-of-hands is used, 
President Jagdeo could see those who have dissented against his chosen candidate. The 
dissenters could be punished by a loss of job and other privileges.  
                                                 
 
4
 “PPP statement on candidate selection shows members ‘no longer count’- Nagamootoo”. (2010, 
September 28). Stabroek News, http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/news/stories/09/28/ppp-statement-on-
candidate-selection-shows-members-%E2%80%98no-longer-count%E2%80%99/.  
 
5 See for instance the article: “PPP retains selection procedure for Presidential candidate”. (2010, 
September 24). Stabroek News, http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/news/stories/09/24/ppp-retains-
selection-procedure-for-presidential-candidate/.   
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Second, like-minded leaders are propelled to the national stage by general 
elections through a party list system. The tinkered 1980 Burnham Constitution thus avails 
significant power to the leaders to essentially form an oligarchic government. The 
national Constitution – written by the PPP’s archrival, the PNC – gives the President 
enormous powers, and the system of proportional representation enshrined in the 
Constitution allows for unaccountable Members of Parliament to be selected by the PPP 
party leaders. While there are free and fair elections, only a narrowly selected list of 
Members of Parliament is offered to the electorate.  
Third, powerful members of the party and selected like-minded government 
officials are in a position to channel state contracts, jobs and even implement laws to 
benefit those with the political connections. One example is the tax breaks offered and 
special government procurement contracts offered to the Queens Atlantic Investment Inc. 
(Ram, 2008). The concessions were granted to Queens Atlantic – owned by a good friend 
of the President – without regard to their legality. The government used its majority in 
Parliament to amend the rules in order to bring the concessions in line with the law. The 
concessions, furthermore, were initiated without open bidding and a business proposal 
from Queens Atlantic to support its purchase of state-owned assets
6
. Another relatively 
more recent example involves the decision by the government to award a road-building 
contract for the Amaila Fall Hydroelectric project to Synergy, a firm that has no major 
road building experience but is expected to construct the access road through virgin 
forests and over swamp terrain (Ram, 2010). The owner of Synergy, like the proprietor of 
Queens Atlantic Investment Inc., is well connected to President Jagdeo. Apart from 
                                                 
6 “Law to be amended for Queens tax breaks.” (2008, June 16). Stabroek News, 
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2008/archives/06/16/law-to-be-amended-for-queens-tax-breaks/.  
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facilitating the favored entrepreneurs who are referred to as the ‘Newly Emerging Private 
Sector’ by President Jagdeo, the government also punishes members of the business 
community who are deemed to be unfriendly. This appears to be the case with Mr. Robert 
Badal who publicly criticized the president at a shareholders’ meeting in 2009. Following 
this incident the President indicated his intention to offer the Marriott chain a government 
subsidy to invest in Guyana. The move by President Jagdeo was intended to encourage 
Marriott to set up operation in Guyana in order to compete with the Pegasus – a 
prestigious hotel owned by Badal (Badal, 2010; Ram, 2010).  
In conclusion, this section describes the following chain of events as the root of 
the elected oligarchy. First, Democratic Centralism allows the few individuals in 
the PPP to select a Presidential Candidate who is then presented to the party 
mass supporters and the nation as a whole (this is the reason why  the President 
wants the method of show-of-hands over that of secret ballots). Second, given 
the entrenched ethnic voting patterns, the Candidate is likely to win the 
national election and therefore enjoy the immunities of the mildly tinkered 
1980 Burnham Constitution. Third, this Candidate then surrounds himself with 
chosen like-minded individuals. Fourth, generous state-sponsored incentives 
are then offered to chosen members of the business class. This allows the 
elected oligarchy to control the economic space in Guyana.   
3. Stylized Facts 
 This section presents some selected stylized data to give a flavor of the 
development challenges Guyana faces. In addition, understanding some of the structural 
 8 
features in the economy will help us to isolate the argument proposed in this paper – that 
an elected oligarchy retards development when the society is ethnically bi-communal.    
In the next section the paper addresses the transmission of causation from elected 
oligarchy to underdevelopment in a bi-communal system.  The first chart, Figure 1, 
compares private investments and government investments as a percentage of GDP. This 
chart shows data from 1993 to 2011. In general the ratio of private investment as a 
percentage of GDP has declined, while in percentage terms government investment has 
increased. In spite of the argument herein that the government is engineering its own 
private business class, the overall total private investment has declined. This would seem 
to point out that the actions of the State to control the business environment for a chosen 
few – while being pro private investments – might have succeeded in decreasing overall 
private investments.  
Figure 1. Government and private investment as a percentage of GDP, 1993 – 2011  
 
 
Data source: Bank of Guyana Annual Reports, various years 
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The structure of production has not changed substantially over the past five 
decades. Production and export are still mainly dependent on gold, rice, bauxite, timber 
and sugar. The services sector, however, has increased in mainly non-tradable services 
such as retail and banking. Structural production transformation was seen as important 
among the classical development economists (see UN, 2006), and also among the more 
modern scholars (see Hausmann et al, 2007; Page, 2012). The Guyanese manufacturing 
sector has declined over the years mirroring the de-industrialization in Africa and 
elsewhere (Page, 2012). The benefits of manufacturing growth is often emphasized by 
economists who underscore the importance of production structure (Thirlwall, 2007; UN, 
2006), and Hausmann et al (2007) shows that specialization in goods at the upper echelon 
of the global hierarchy of exports results in knowledge spill over from one sector to the 
next. The structure of ownership of production is also important in a political economy 
context. When elites are land owners who are involved in extractive industries, 
democratic roots my not consolidate. The consolidation might take deeper roots in 
societies that are industrial and where there is a high accumulation of human capital 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).   
Economic development and structural production change have to be financed. 
Capital mobility, moreover, has implications for the willingness of elites to repress 
democratic demands (Boix, 2003). If elites are easily able to send capital abroad in times 
of stress, then they may be more willing to accommodate the democratic institutions 
others may demand. There has been a significant movement towards financial sector 
reforms and capital account liberalization in Guyana (Khemraj, 2008; Egoume-Bossogo 
et al, 2003). The implication here is funds can be easily transferred abroad in times of 
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political or economic stress. In spite of efforts to liberalize the financial system and 
promote capital and money market development, the financial system has remained 
dominated by oligopolistic commercial banks as asset concentration among banks has 
increased and there are fewer banks than under the period of financial repression. The 
entry of a few foreign banks has not changed this situation, perhaps because the size of 
the economy and level of economic activities act as natural entry barriers, thereby making 
the banking system non-contestable. Commercial banks lend mainly to established 
borrowers, they hold large amounts of excess liquidly, and the loan-deposit interest rate 
spread has widened since the early 1990s (Khemraj, 2008).  
4. Resource Control and Undemocratic Structures 
This section shows that entrenched ethnic voting in a bi-communal society can 
result in a Nash equilibrium that perpetuates unequal development. Before presenting the 
ethnic conflict in a strategic game, the paper shows the inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic 
relations in a flow diagram. The notable game-theoretic studies (on the emergence and 
consolidation of democracy) upon which this paper seeks inspiration are Boix (2003) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). This work has a few differences relative to Boix’s 
framework in which the Constitution is not important for generating the choice of 
democratic regime. According to Boix inequality of income and capital mobility are the 
key factors driving the elites to accommodate or not to accommodate. In this paper, the 
Constitution – which bestows significant powers and immunities to the President and 
promotes winner-take-all politics – allows for the control of economic resources by the 
elected elites. The other two key differences of this work are: (i) the paper applies a 
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game-theoretic method to a bi-communal voting structure; and (ii) there is within group 
and inter-group heterogeneity.  
One representative ethnic voter cannot know how the other ethnic voter will 
choose in a secret ballot. Since intra-ethnic social networking will play a role in the 
distribution of resources, and therefore influence inter-ethnic income growth payoff and 
inequality, the representative voter has to play it safe by voting for elites from within her 
group. This fear works well for the elites of the ethnic group with the slight numerical 
advantage. If they can gerrymander internal party elections as explained in section 2, they 
will enjoy the benefit of power the Constitution brings and establish a system of 
controlling private investments – hence the elected oligarchy.   
The Constitution, therefore, allows for the winning elite to distribute resources to 
its ethnic group through employment, public procurement and other rights to resources 
(Norton, 2007). However, the winning elites are cognizant of the likelihood that the other 
group may rebel, especially since the group that loses the election forms a significant 
segment of the population. Therefore, they may be willing to bear some cost of 
redistribution and avoid complete discrimination (Milne, 1988). The redistribution could 
be done in two ways. First, the winning elite may pay off the losing elite so as to pacify 
the losers. Second, enough public works might get done so that all citizens may benefit. 
At first sight the first method of redistribution is most deleterious and engenders the 
greatest income inequality. The second method may be less severe. However, it can also 
be pernicious. For example, if the public projects are mainly built by inexperienced 
friends of one ethnic group the public goods may not be optimally developed, chosen or 
sequenced, thus resulting in a waste of economic resources (Boakye, 2012). In addition 
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the government could subsidize friendly business to compete with those it considers not 
on its side. Regardless of the method of redistribution chosen income inequality will be 
generated.    
A contribution of this work is the introduction of heterogeneous masses and elites. 
Henceforth, we will assume four primary groups in the model: East Indian elites (EIEs), 
African Guyanese elites (AGEs), East Indian masses (EIMs) and African Guyanese 
masses (AGMs). In a bi-communal society there could also be a third heterogeneous 
minority group made up of mix ethnicities and other groups; however, for the purpose of 
the analysis we will assume they are not large enough to alter the electoral outcomes. In 
the case of Guyana this is not an unrealistic assumption because of the entrenched ethnic 
voting that limits the possibility for regular democratic turnover in the government. The 
East Indian population is approximately 45%, African Guyanese approximately 38%, 
Indigenous Guyanese 9% and mixed Guyanese account for the remainder.  
The minority groups can be treated as the independent voters. As a result, they 
would tend to be more willing to vote for an independent third party. An obvious 
question that emerges is if East Indians only form 45% what is preventing the minority 
groups from voting for the AGEs and therefore remove the elected oligarchy? The short 
answer is the Constitution allows the party that wins the largest percentage of the votes to 
form the government; furthermore, there can be no post-election coalitions. Therefore, 
using patronage and resource transfers EIEs only need to maintain their core votes from 
EIMs and win over a sufficient percentage of Indigenous and other independent votes.  
As we develop the strategic behavior below it will be seen that the third party 
does not change the nature of the Nash equilibrium. The third party does not draw 
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significant support from the two dominant ethnic groups because of the inherent fears 
highlighted earlier. The voting is taking place as a simultaneous move game or secret 
ballot on one day. Since EIMs do not know how AGMs will vote they vote for EIEs; 
AGMs also do not know how EIMs will vote, therefore they vote for AGEs. In is 
scenario the independent third party faces an existential threat as it could fail to win even 
a single seat at the election.    
Figure 2 shows the main voting pattern, resource control and resource allocation 
in our bi-communal setup. At the pinnacle of the diagram is the box of resources that 
elites can control if they win the election. The elites who earn the goodies in this box will 
experience the fastest accumulation of capital and therefore income growth. Given the 
numerical advantage of EIMs, EIEs win the election and are therefore in a position to 
control the government and natural resources. Aware of the possibility of discontents 
among its core support, EIEs transfer some compensation to EIMs. This is shown by the 
downward pointing arrow from EIEs to EIMs. Aware of the possibility of rebellion, EIEs 
will transfer some compensation to AGMs; this is shown by diagonally pointing arrow 
from EIEs to AGMs. EIEs may also try to drive a wedge between AGMs and AGEs by 
compensating the latter in more generous terms. Some of these strategic relations will be 
developed in the game later in the paper. Suffice to say, the elites who control the State 
and the natural resources will experience the highest income growth and therefore will be 
in a position to share resources with its group. In that case, we assume EIEs will 
experience the highest income growth and share of resource endowment. Therefore, 
inequality is a natural outcome of this process of ethnic voting and resource allocation.  
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The two lower boxes in Figure 2 have a bi-directional arrow between EIMs and 
AGMs, indicating the mutual distrust between the two main ethnic groups. This distrust 
is played out in ethnic voting at election time. As noted earlier, a representative voter 
perceives that if the other side wins the national election then her economic fortunes will 
worsen. The representative voter also does not know how the other voter will vote. 
Therefore, to protect her perceived economic interest she votes for the elites within her 
ethnic group. We will make the assumption that a voter perceives her income will grow 
the fastest if the elites from her group win. This is not an unrealistic assumption given the 
intra-ethnic social networking. The party that wins obviously will turn to trusted 
members of its ethnic group for key jobs, contract procurements and resource allocations.  
 
Figure 2. Voting pattern and resource allocations in Guyana 
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Let us write out the utility payoff of each agent to reflect some of the strategic 
details explained above. The risk-averse EIEs have the following utility (where 1a  ). 
The variable C represents the costs of redistribution the EIEs must bear to preserve the 
status quo. Let us assume a simple cost function that will subtract from utility of EIEs,
2
EIEC y . 
a
EIE EIEU y C          (1) 
Income of ( EIEy ) of EIEs is accumulated as follows 
EIE
EIE EIE
K
y k
K

   
 
        (2) 
EIEk is the capital stock of EIE ( EIEK ) as a ratio of the total capital stock of the country 
(K). The parameter 1  indicates diminishing returns to capital. Diminishing returns is a 
plausible assumption in this case given that capital is mainly deployed in extractive 
industries and agriculture. The manufacturing sector is underdeveloped and the service 
sector is mainly in the form of the non-traded variety. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
paper we can ignore the usual technology variable in this type of production function.  
The utility of the representative EIM is follows 
1
b
EIM EIMU y C           (3) 
The income of EIM is determined as follows  
EIM
EIM EIM
K
y k
K

   
 
        (4) 
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EIMk is the ratio EIM capital to the total of the country. The percentage of the cost that 
EIE bear that is paid to EIM is given as 1C , thereby adding to the utility of EIM. The 
parameter 1  indicates diminishing returns of capital, while the parameter 1b 
indicates diminishing marginal utility.  
The utility earned by AGE is expressed as 
2
c
AGE AGEU y C           (5) 
Income is accumulated as follow 
AGE
AGE AGE
K
y k
K

   
 
        (6) 
AGEk is the ratio of the country’s total capital stock shared by AGE. The parameter 1 
indicates diminishing returns to capital ownership and the parameter 1c  indicates 
diminishing marginal utility. The share of the cost redistributed towards AGE is 2C . 
Finally the utility gained by AGM is expressed as  
3
d
AGM AGMU y C           (7) 
Income grows as follows 
AGM
AGM AGM
K
y k
K

   
 
        (8) 
AGMk shows the ratio of the country’s total capital owned by AGM. 3C is the share of 
redistribution that goes to AGM. The following parameter values and conditions are 
assumed to hold 1d  , 1  and 1 2 3 1     . Also the sum of the capital shares is 
equal to 1 ( 1EIE EIM AGE AGMk k k k    ).  
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Similar to Boix (2003), ethnic income inequality is built into the model by 
differences in ratio of ownership of capital. The identity 1EIE EIM AGE AGMk k k k   
shows that if any group’s relative share of capital increases that group will experience a 
higher threshold of income, while the other gets a smaller share. The political structures 
discussed earlier imply that if EIE continues to win the election owing to the ethnic 
numerical majority of EIM then they can continue to own a larger share of capital. 
However, EIE can only continue to own more of productive capital by redistributing 
some resources to EIM, AGM and AGE. This redistribution can be done through token 
mechanisms so as to maintain the status quo of an elected oligarchy in which democracy 
has not consolidated. Or the redistribution can take the form of constitutional changes 
that allows for some form of power sharing. This is likely to result in more egalitarian 
accumulation of productive capital as it allows co-operation.  
Using domestic the institutional context, the paper shows how the Nash 
equilibrium of unequal development can result from an entrenched ethnic voting pattern. 
A representative voter AGM has two options when voting in a secret ballot. Vote for 
AGE or vote for a multi-ethnic independent third party. Of course the representative 
AGM voter has the option to vote for EIEs. However, this is not likely to occur in any 
large number to alter the election; therefore we can exclude this strategy. On the other 
hand, the representative EIM has two strategies: vote for EIEs or a multi-ethnic 
independent third party. Let us also assume that EIM will not vote for AGE to 
fundamentally alter the election result. However, they may be willing to vote for a multi-
ethnic independent third party. Assume the utility payoffs are as given in the table below. 
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On the surface it would appear that the best outcome for both AGM and EIM is 
for them to ignore ethnic allegiance and vote for the multi-ethnic political party. This 
allows a genuine multi-ethnic group of leaders to emerge, backed by cross-ethnic support 
and networks. Here the multi-ethnic government would be able to allocate resources 
more equitably across groups as social networking processes will more likely draw on 
people from diverse backgrounds; in this case let us assume the utility of (10, 10) results. 
However, uncertainty and suspicion at secret ballot brings distrust, which is further 
accentuated by the pro-ethnic campaigns of the respective elites. The representative EIM 
does not know how the representative AGM will vote. If EIM votes for the independent 
party and AGM does not, then the utility payoff is (2, 15). This utility results because 
enough EIM votes independently to allow AGEs to win. Distribution of resources will be 
skewed in favor AGM – thus resulting in the skewed utility payoff. On the other hand, 
AGM does not know how EIM will vote in secret ballot. She knows if she votes for the 
independent party and EIM does not then EIE will win the election with a utility payoff 
of (15, 2). 
 
Table 1. Utility payoff from bi-communal voting 
 AGM 
 
EIM 
 Vote AGE Vote multi-ethnic 
party 
Vote EIE 5EIMU  ; 3AGMU   15EIMU  ; 2AGMU   
Vote multi-ethnic party 2EIMU  ; 15AGMU   10EIMU  ; 10AGMU   
 
 The classic prisoner’s dilemma game would predict the Nash equilibrium in 
which each group votes for its respect ethnic leaders. Since East Indian elites win the 
 19 
election the intra-group social networking will see EIM getting a higher payoff. This will 
lead to an uneven distribution of investment capital, and therefore unlikely to lead to the 
higher level of overall group satisfaction. The Nash equilibrium of (5, 3) results because 
each group plays it safe as it cannot trust how the other group will vote on the day of 
secret ballot
7
. Although this is a simple one shot game, both groups are guided by 
historical voting patterns to observe they cannot fully trust the other group on the day of 
secret ballot. EIMs enjoy a slightly higher rate of growth because the possibility exists for 
intra-group networking to be in their favor. However, this equilibrium is clearly sub-
optimal compared with choosing the independent party. A further auxiliary result taking 
place is the difficulty an independent third party will face in emerging as a serious 
challenge to the status quo.  
5. Democratic Consolidation 
Why don’t the elites cooperate and reform the Constitution for the greater good to 
promote power sharing as some scholars have noted could be applicable to these 
societies? The development economist Arthur Lewis (Lewis, 1965) proposed power 
sharing as a means of easing the conflicts in West Africa. In the context of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game above, a constitution promoting power sharing could remove the 
uncertainty and distrust among the two masses and allow them to escape the sub-optimal 
Nash equilibrium. In other words, a constitution that incentivizes cooperation instead of 
                                                 
7 Theoretical and empirical work would lend support to the assumed payoff structure. Theoretical work by 
Acemoglu (2008) suggests that oligarchies would tend to result in long-term growth that is lower than 
democracies. The author’s model shows that oligarchies would tend to earn a growth spike in the short-
term because entry barriers are erected against those who are not connected. However, this growth will not 
sustain itself in the long-term because other elites may threaten the incumbent.  In addition, theoretical 
work done by Boakye (2012) shows that social polarization leads to discriminatory practices, inefficient 
allocation of resources and diminished growth prospects. Empirical research also suggests that countries 
with democratic institutions enjoy superior long-term growth (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2006). Empirical 
research by Rodrik (2000) observed that participatory political regimes are better at dealing with adverse 
short-term shocks and sustaining long-term growth.  
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competition might be necessary. This idea is founded in the literature. For example 
Josselin and Marciano (2002) noted the need for constitutional instruments in addition to 
property rights. And Rodrik (2000) notes the need for political institutions for managing 
ethnic conflict.  
The present Guyanese constitution, however, allows the winner to take all (minus 
the cost of paying off the others for maintaining the peace); therefore, the winner does not 
have the incentive to accommodate towards power sharing when they can have it all. This 
therefore begs the question of under what circumstances will EIEs be willing to 
accommodate? The previous literature by Boix (2003) emphasized inequality and capital 
mobility as determining consolidation.  Soifer (2013) argues that state capacity is 
necessary for reinforcing the effect of inequality on the process of democratic 
accommodation. Elites in countries with strong state capabilities are more likely to 
accommodate, according to Soifer. However, this work extends the literature by 
examining whether remittances and bi-lateral grants can postpone democratic 
consolidation. 
East Indian elite democratic accommodation function  
 EIE will only accommodate democratic reforms when the marginal income of the 
oligarchy falls below the marginal cost of maintaining the system. Therefore, the level of 
EIEk that is consistent with the equality of marginal benefit and marginal cost of 
maintaining the political system is the upper threshold on owning the means of income 
growth, capital. If EIE wishes to hold more income generating capital then they must 
incur more marginal disutility than marginal benefit. Substituting 2EIEC y and Equation 2 
gives the modified utility function 
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2a
EIE EIE EIEU k k
            (9) 
The EIE democratic accommodation function is obtained as follows 
1 2 12 0aEIE EIE EIE
EIE
dU
a k k
dk
       
Depending on the parameter values of a and , *EIEk will solve for the upper threshold 
level of capital, after which point it is more costly to maintain the oligarchy. This 
relationship will be used later to examine how the exogenous variable of bi-lateral 
transfers will influence EIE’s willingness to accommodate.   
East Indian masses apathy function 
The utility of East Indian masses can be modified as follows 21
b
EIM EIM EIEU k k
  
after substituting the cost function and Equation 4. Since 1EIE EIM AGE AGMk k k k    we 
can obtain the utility function that helps us to derive the EIM function of apathy, named 
as such to emphasize the point at which East Indian masses do not care for any more 
transfers from EIE. The intuition here is the concave utility has reached its maximum 
point, thus transfers from EIE gives zero marginal utility. Given the set up above if EIM 
become apathetic in large enough numbers then the EIE, the elected oligarchs, loses 
power and there is democratic turnover at a free and fair election. The following utility 
allows for deriving the EIM apathy function.  
2
1(1 )
b
EIM EIM EIM AGE AGMU k k k k
            (10) 
The apathy function is therefore 
2 1
12 (1 ) 0
bEIM
EIM EIM AGE AGM
EIM
dU
b k k k k
dk
             (11) 
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An interesting feature of this function is if EIE increases token transfers to EIM – 
that is increase 1 just to maintain the status quo of an elected oligarchy – it diminishes the 
value of apathy assuming the other parameters and variables are unchanged. It is in the 
interest of EIE to keep EIM, AGE and AGM pacified so as not to challenge the political 
status quo. However, what happens if EIMk increases thereby showing redistribution of 
capital from EIE to EIM? This we will need to analyze using numerical simulation for 
apathy given two parameter possibilities 2 1 0   and 2 1 0   . In general, we can note 
that redistribution will reduce apathy, thereby making EIM less comfortable with the 
status quo. Therefore, this paper argues that instead of token redistribution a policy of 
genuine redistribution (or power sharing) can be crafted to facilitate cooperation.  
African Guyanese elite apathy function 
Under what condition will AGE challenge the system? In other words, at what 
level of inequality will AGE prefer conflict instead of acceptance of the elected 
oligarchy? In the set up above AGE do not possess the numbers to change electoral 
results. They also do not possess the financial resources to compensate AGM; rather they 
depend on the fears of AGM to maintain the entrenched voting arrangement. Therefore, 
their strategy of rebellion would likely be to maintain the support of their masses as a 
means of continuing their political stand vis-à-vis EIEs. Let us now look at the utility of 
AGE so that we can study how their degree of apathy changes with capital accumulation 
and compensation from EIE.  
Substituting the cost function of EIE so that it enters the utility of AGE gives
2
2
c
AGE AGE EIEU k k
   . This can be further expressed as 
2
2(1 )
c
AGE AGE EIM AGE AGMU k k k k
            (12) 
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The AGE apathy function is obtained as follows 
2 1
22 (1 ) 0
cAGE
AGE EIM AGE AGM
AGE
dU
c k k k k
dk
             (13) 
It is clear from this function that increasing token transfers from EIM to AGE – that is 
increasing 2 – will decrease apathy, thus making AGE less comfortable with the system 
of oligarchy. The apathy function also suggests that a better way of inducing apathy is for 
redistribution of capital ownership from EIE to AGM. This may point the way towards 
developing political institutions that can improve distribution through co-operation. The 
numerical simulation below shows the possible apathy values for the two possibilities
2 1 0   and 2 1 0   . 
African Guyanese masses apathy function 
AGMs are numerically the second most dominant group after EIM. Let us analyze 
the utility of this group and study the effects of capital accumulation and token transfers. 
The utility is as follows 23
d
AGM AGM EIEU k k
    and can be rewritten as  
2
3(1 )
d
AGM AGM EIM AGE AGMU k k k k
            (14) 
The apathy function is derived as follows 
2 1
32 (1 ) 0
dAGM
AGM EIM AGE AGM
AGM
dU
c k k k k
dk
             (15) 
It is clear from this function that increasing token transfers by an increase in 3 will 
reduce apathy and make the elected oligarchy less desirable. However, apathy can decline 
for a more noteworthy reason like redistribution of capital from EIE to AGM. Let us look 
at the simulations to see the possible outcomes.  
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Model simulation 
The apathy function is similar for each group. Only the parameter values in the 
utility and income growth function are different, and so too are the relative shares of 
compensation.  In that case only one function is simulated for different parameter values. 
The function is simulated for two possibilities 2 1 0   (apathy 1) and 2 1 0   (apathy 
2). Assume that jk takes values from 0 to 0.7 (where , ,j EIM AGE AGM ). The upper 
limit of 0.7 ratio is assumed to be the maximum any single group can achieve. Figure 3 
shows the decline in apathy for the two parameter restrictions above. Apathy 2 starts off 
at a lower threshold and declines faster as the group accumulates capital. Apathy 1 is 
more interesting. It starts off at a higher threshold and declines at a slower rate. After 
reaching a minimum point it increases gradually. The results suggest that crafting 
democratic institutions to allow for more egalitarian distribution can motivate people to 
play a more active role in democracy.     
 
Figure 3. Simulation of apathy function for EIM, AGE and AGM (horizontal axis jk and 
vertical axis measures apathy) 
 
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
.0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
K of EIE
Apathy 1
Apathy 2
 25 
Bi-lateral grants 
 
Exogenous variables may influence the consolidation of democracy. We turn to 
this question by first analyzing how bi-lateral transfers to EIM will influence their 
willingness to accommodate democratic reforms. Later the influence of remittances on 
the apathy function of EIM, AGE and AGM will be analyzed. Let us assume that the 
ruling elites get bi-lateral funding from a foreign government – a reasonable assumption 
since we have noted that EIE won the election and forms the government. EIE receives a 
transfer   that is a percent of GDP; assume 0 1  . Transfers allow EIE’s income to 
grow as follows (1 )EIE EIEy k
   . Therefore the utility function of EIE can be re- 
expressed as follows. 
2 2(1 ) (1 )a aEIE EIE EIEU k k
             (16) 
The function comparing the marginal benefit and marginal cost of EIE democratic 
accommodation is derived as follows. The function embeds the rate of bi-lateral transfer 
in marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC). 
1 2 1 2(1 ) 2 (1 ) 0a aEIE EIE EIE
EIE
dU
ak k
dk
               (17) 
 
Let us use the method of simulation instead of working out the analytical 
derivative in order to examine the effect of bi-lateral transfers on EIEs democratic 
accommodation. The simulation takes place for various values of  ( 0 1  ). If MB is 
greater than or equal to MC over some range of then EIEs are much less likely to accept 
democratic accommodation.  If MB is less than MC over the same range of  then 
accommodation is more likely because it is costly to keep paying off others for 
maintaining the peace. Figure 4 shows as capital level rises, the net marginal benefit of 
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transfers falls towards negative when 2 1 0   . However, for 0.2EIEk  bi-lateral 
transfers up to 30 percent of GDP would tend to lead to positive net marginal benefit; 
hence less likelihood of EIE democratic accommodation. On the other hand, once
2 1 0   the net marginal benefit is always negative no matter the level of capital 
ownership. In the latter case EIEs may be more likely to accommodate.  
 
Figure 4. The effects of bi-lateral grants to EIE on democratic accommodation for 
2 1 0   and 2 1 0    
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with a very high remittance to GDP ratio given the very large diaspora community. Each 
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supplement each group’s domestic capital. The two equations allow for rewriting the 
utility function that is used to derive the apathy function with remittances.  
2(1 ) (1 )e ej j j j EIM AGE AGEU k k k k
             (18) 
The apathy function with remittances is as follows. 
1 2 1(1 ) 2 (1 ) 0
j e e
j j j EIM AGE AGE
j
dU
e k k k k
dk
              (19) 
Let A represent /j jdU dk . The effect of the exogenous remittance share is given as 
follows.  
2 1 1(1 ) 0
j e e
j j
j
dA
e k
d
 

           (20) 
Equation 20 shows that remittances would unambiguously increase apathy. This would 
be akin to an outward shift in the curves in Figure 3. The implication here is the three 
groups may be less willing to pursue democratic change as remittances continue to rise as 
a percentage of GDP.  
6. Concluding Remarks  
Democratic elections can result in an elected oligarchy where economic 
development can be stymied. This paper examined how this could occur in a bi-
communal society with entrenched ethnic voting. After controlling the outcome of 
internal party elections, the elites select leaders who are then offered for national 
elections. The East Indian numerical majority almost guarantees victory for the East 
Indian elites. They then use the power enshrined in the Constitution to evade 
accountability, prevent local elections, control the state media and allocate resources to 
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friendly business interests. The intra-ethnic social networking implies that East Indian 
masses enjoy a relatively faster rate of accumulation of income.  
The paper uses a simple strategic game to show how uncertainty and distrust 
between the masses of the two dominant groups reinforce the ethnic elites and allow for a 
Nash equilibrium in which unequal income growth will result. Therefore, the paper 
argues that the development process is stymied. After using a simple game from which 
the sub-optimal development equilibrium is derived, the paper presents a formal model to 
work out the scenarios under which democratic transition may occur. It suggests that 
token resource transfers from East Indian elites to African Guyanese elites and East 
Indian masses do not guarantee that the regime of elected oligarchy can continue 
indefinitely. The model suggests that promoting redistribution through cooperation can 
result in higher utility and income accumulation for all groups – hence a more balanced 
development. In this case, a constitution promoting power sharing is needed to remove 
the uncertainty and escape the sub-optimal Nash equilibrium. Bi-lateral transfers from 
one government to the elites could postpose democratic accommodation when the elites 
are in the early stage of income accumulation. Remittances to other groups could increase 
apathy and slow the desire for seeking political reforms.     
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